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Evolutionary games on graphs have been extensively studied. A variety of graph structures,
graph dynamics, and behaviours of replicators have been explored. These models have primarily
been studied in the framework of facilitation of cooperation, and much previous research has shed
light on this field of study. However, there has been little attention devoted to truncation selection as
most models employ proportional selection (such as in the replicator equation) or “imitate the best.”
Here we systematically explore truncation selection on periodic square lattices, where replicators
below a fitness threshold are culled and the reproduction probabilities are equal for all survivors.
We employ two variations of this method: independent truncation, where the threshold is fixed;
and dependent truncation, which is a generalization of “imitate the best.” Further, we explore the
effects of diffusion in our networks in the following orders of operation: contest-diffusion-offspring
(CDO), and diffusion-contest-offspring (DCO). CDO and DCO frequently facilitate and diminish
cooperation, respectively. For independent truncation, we find three regimes determined by the
fitness threshold: cooperation decreases as we raise the threshold; polymorphisms and extinction
can occur; and the entire population goes extinct. Further, we show how an intermediate sucker’s
payoff maximizes cooperation in the DCO independent truncation model. We find that dependent
truncation affects games differently; lower levels reduce cooperation for the Hawk Dove game and
increase it for the Stag Hunt, and higher levels produce the opposite effects. We compare these
truncation methods to proportional selection, and show that they can facilitate cooperation. We
conclude that truncation selection can impact the prevalence of cooperation in complex ways, and
therefore merit further study.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation is frequently modelled
by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, this model faces a
tragedy of the commons in which defection is favoured
over cooperation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a symmet-
ric game with two strategies: cooperate (c) and defect
(d) with payoff matrix
Π =
( c d
c R S
d T P
)
(1)
where T > R > P > S. Though the socially optimal
strategy profile is (c, c), due to the temptation to cheat,
T , the suboptimal strategy profile (d, d) is an evolution-
arily stable state (ESS) [15]. This game and others are
frequently studied in the parameter space determined by:
R = 1, −1 ≤ S ≤ 1, P = 0, and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2 [29]. Thus,
for −1 ≤ S < 0 and 1 < T ≤ 2, we have the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. 0 < S ≤ 1 and 1 < T ≤ 2, we have the
Hawk Dove game and a mixed ESS. For −1 ≤ S < 0 and
0 ≤ T < 1, we have the Stag Hunt game and bistability.
And, for 0 < S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T < 1, we have the harmony
game where the ESS is socially optimal. Figure 1 depicts
the frequency of cooperators at the interior equilibrium
(if there is one) or at the exterior ESS. For the area of pa-
rameter space that represents the Hawk Dove game, this
is the ESS. For the area of the Stag Hunt, this represents
the size of the basin of attraction of cooperation.
A variety of evolutionary dynamics have been used to
explore these games [19, 25]. Here we will focus on an
extensively studied framework, evolutionary games on
graphs [23, 28, 31], where agents are represented by ver-
tices and interact with other vertices with which they
share edges [11, 22]. Each vertex has a specific strat-
egy that it follows. In many studies, including this one,
we assume that the players always play the same pure
strategy regardless of the strategies of their neighbours.
From these interactions, vertices earn payoffs — the av-
erage or sum of which is their fitness — that determine
survival by some selection method. Lattice models of this
kind can increase cooperation [16] or reduce cooperation
in the Snowdrift game [12], depending on the selection
method and game employed. A variety of different inva-
sion scenarios have been studied in this framework [9],
and it has been shown that cooperators can successfully
invade [18].
Once payoffs have been assigned and fitnesses calcu-
lated, selection occurs. Each vertex compares its fitness
to those of its neighbours to determine what strategy will
occupy the vertex next turn. A common selection mech-
anism used in spatial games is proportional selection,
where a vertex will randomly choose one of its neigh-
bours, and adopt the neighbour’s strategy with proba-
bility proportional to the difference in their fitnesses [3],
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Cooperation in parameter space
FIG. 1: Interpolated heatmap of cooperation in
parameter space. White corresponds to defection and
black to cooperation. In the harmony (top left
quadrant), Hawk-Dove (top right quadrant), and
Prisoner’s Dilemma (bottom right quadrant) areas of
parameter space, the colour represents the equilibrium
frequency of cooperation (white is All Defect, black is
All Cooperate, and grey an intermediate amount of
cooperation). In the Stag Hunt area (bottom left
quadrant), we have bistability. Thus, the heatmap
represents the magnitude of the basin of attraction of
cooperation.
FIG. 2: Interpolated heatmap of average cooperation
over 100 simulations for proportional selection with
simulation length of 200 turns and d = 0 (a), DCO
d = 1 (b), and CDO d = 1 (c). White corresponds to
defection and black to cooperation.
FIG. 1. Heatma f cooper tion in parameter space. White
corresponds to defection and black to cooperation. I the har-
mony (top left quadrant), Hawk Dove (top right quadrant),
and Prisoner’s Dilemma (bottom right quadrant) areas of pa-
rameter space, the colour represents the equilibrium frequency
of cooperation (white is All Defect, black is All Cooperate,
and grey an intermediate amount of cooperation). In the
Stag Hunt area (bottom left quadrant), w have bistability.
Thus, the heatmap rep sents the magn tude of the basin of
attraction of cooperation (i.e. 1−proportion of cooperators).
which is equivalent to th replicator equation for an infi-
nite population [14]. Another common selection mecha-
nism is “imitate the best,” in which the focal vertex will
compare its fitness (the sum of all interactions with its
neighbours) to the fitnesses of neighbouring vertices [11].
Its strategy will then become the strategy of the vertex
with the greatest fitness. If there is a tie, it will be deter-
mined randomly from the maximal fitness neighbours.
Truncation selection occurs when a proportion of the
population is culled and the survivors reproduce to fill
the gap in the population. However, the reproduction
rate is equal amongst all survivors (it is not scaled by fit-
ness). Two types of truncation selection are dependent
and independent [21]. In dependent truncation, the top
τ of the population survives and reproduces, while the
remainder are culled. For τ = 1 on a graph, we have the
“imitate the best” rule. In independent truncation, repli-
cators with fitnesses greater than some fitness threshold
φ survive and reproduce, and those below it are culled.
Note that reproduction is not dependent upon the degree
to which a replicator is above the threshold for survival.
This asymmetry in selection results in significant differ-
ences from the replicator equation, potentially displaying
chaos and significant levels of cooperation where none are
represented in the replicator equation employing identi-
cal games [5–8, 21]. A model that employs a degree of
independent truncation is studied in [37]. Vertices are
removed from the graph if their fitnesses are below a
threshold. Vertices created as replacements have prefer-
ential connections to vertices with high fitnesses. After
this process, there is proportional selection.
A variety of graphs have been explored, ranging from
lattices with periodic or aperiodic boundaries, to small
world graphs, and to random regular graphs [3]. Scale-
fre networks with different levels of d gree-degree cor-
relations and en anced cl stering have been shown to
facilitate cooperation [26]. Cooperators perf rm better
on random regular graphs than they do on regular small
world graphs, which perform better than square lattices
[13].
Dynamic graphs are graphs where the edges change
over time. By altering the degree of dynamism of the
graph, a variety of mechanisms (such as the Red Queen)
can lead to high levels of cooperation [32]. This pro-
cess can be random or determined by vertex behaviour
[34]. In the behavioural model, vertices may choose to
break edges by examining the payoffs earned from neigh-
bours with whom they share them [4, 24], breaking edges
with non-cooperating neighbours [27], or form edges with
those vertices that have high payoffs [35, 36]. Other
means to study this behaviour include models where the
agents move on a plane [2, 10]. They interact with those
within some Euclidean distance, which in some models is
heterogeneous [37]. After a certain time they reproduce.
Cooperation can be supported in such models, but only
when the agents’ velocities are low [20]. Scale-free graphs
are the most resilient to this effect [17].
Another method of graph dynamism is diffusion, where
vertices swap places in the graphs, or, equivalently, ver-
tices swap strategies with neighbouring vertices. The or-
der of the operations: contest, C; diffusion (graph dy-
namism), D; and offspring, O, heavily affects the results
[30, 33]. CDO ordering of operations often inhibits the
effects of graph structure [30].
Here we systematically explore independent and de-
pendent truncation selection on periodic square lattices
of a stochastic 2 player game. Additionally, we study
diffusion with both DCO and CDO operations. We com-
pare our results to models that use Fermi selection —
which produces similar results to proportional selection
[3] — since it better accommodates stochastic payoffs.
II. METHODS
We construct a 50 × 50 periodic square lattice. We
assign to vertices the cooperator strategy with proba-
bility 0.5, and the remaining vertices are inhabited by
defectors. We averaged 50 realizations with 100 turns
each for each parameter value we explored, and employed
synchronous contests, diffusion, and reproduction. The
order of operations each turn is: contest, diffusion, and
offspring for CDO; and diffusion, contest, and offspring
for DCO, which we detail in the following paragraphs in
the order: contest, diffusion, and offspring.
During the contest phase, players interact with each
vertex with which they share an edge, and earn the pay-
off piij + ξ from these interactions. ξ ∼ N (0, 0.42) is a
Gaussian white noise variable and piij is drawn from the
3payoff matrix,
Π =
(
1 S
T 0
)
. (2)
From the payoffs received from each interaction we cal-
culate the fitness of vertex vi,
fi =
1
|Vi|
∑
vj∈Vi
piij + ξ, (3)
where Vi is the set of inhabited neighbours of vi and piij
is the payoff vi receives playing neighbour vj . We vary T
and S with increments of 0.1.
Diffusion occurs by randomly selecting vertices to swap
strategies with their neighbours. Each turn we simulate
2500 of these diffusion processes, which gives us an av-
erage diffusion rate of 1. We explored higher diffusion
rates (d = 2, 5). However, we found that these diffusion
rates did not sufficiently affect our results.
During the offspring phase, the vertices’ strategies are
updated. We employ three different selection/updat-
ing rules: Fermi, dependent truncation, and independent
truncation. For each vertex, we examine it and its neigh-
bours’ fitnesses and employ our selection method to de-
termine what strategy will occupy the vertex next turn.
For Fermi selection, we uniformly randomly select a ver-
tex, vj , from the set, Vi∪{vi}. Then, the probability that
vi with strategy si will adopt the neighbour’s strategy,
sj , is
P (si → sj) = 1
1 + exp(−(fj − fi)/κ) . (4)
For 0.1 ≤ κ ≤ 1. We explore the case where κ = 1.
For independent truncation we determine selection by
the following algorithm: for each vi we determine the set
V ′i = {vj ∈ Vi ∪ {vi} : fj ≥ φ}, (5)
where φ is the truncation threshold. We then set vi’s
strategy to the strategy of a randomly selected vertex
of V ′i . Note that independent truncation can result in
V ′i = ∅. In this case, vi becomes uninhabited. Such
empty vertices hold no strategy and do not compete with
their neighbours. However, they are still a part of the
graph with respect to diffusion, and offspring may be
born at them. If |Vi| = ∅, we set fi = 0 (as there are no
opponents to play).
For dependent truncation, we compare the fitness of
vi and its neighbouring vertices and determine the set of
vertices that are in the top τ with respect to fitness. We
then set the strategy of vi to the strategy of a randomly
selected vertex from this set.
FIG. 2. Heatmap of average cooperation for Fermi selection
with no diffusion (a), CDO (b), and DCO (c). White corre-
sponds to defection and black to cooperation.
III. RESULTS
A. Fermi selection
To enable comparison with the truncation selection re-
sults, in figure 2 we plot the heatmap for Fermi selection
with no diffusion, and for CDO and DCO. The no diffu-
sion observation matches similar results in the literature,
where clustering in structured models facilitates cooper-
ation in the Stag Hunt game, and inhibits it in the Hawk
Dove game [28] relative to the mean field case (Figure
1). We observe less cooperation in Figure 2 than in Fig-
ure 1, since the clustering coefficient, C¯ = 0, is low for
our graph [1]. CDO diffusion increases cooperation as
observed in the Hawk Dove, Stag Hunt, and harmony do-
mains of parameter space. Cooperators within a cluster
of cooperators will have a higher fitness than defectors in
a defector cluster. Thus, cooperators that diffuse into a
defector cluster will propagate, whilst defectors that dif-
fuse into a cooperator cluster will likely die. This effect
has been similarly observed in [30, 33]. However, this
phenomenon diminishes cooperation in the DCO case.
Defectors can diffuse into a cluster of cooperators and
compete with them thereby disrupting cooperation.
B. Independent truncation
We observe a variety of behaviours for independent
truncation that can be classified into three regimes that
are dependent upon the fitness threshold, φ: φ  0,
40 ≤ φ ≤ 1, and φ  1. In the first, the population does
not go extinct and cooperation decreases as we increase φ.
In the second, cooperation can be facilitated and extinc-
tion primarily occurs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma quad-
rant. And, in the third, extinction occurs everywhere in
parameters space. Phase transitions with respect to φ
are also observed in a mean field model of independent
truncation [21].
Figure 3 portrays a variety of interesting heatmaps
of the independent truncation model with no diffusion.
Panels a and b are representative of the results for φ 0.
In this regime, defectors will frequently be above the
threshold to survive throughout parameter space and re-
gardless with whom they are playing. Cooperators, how-
ever, may be selected against if they compete with a suf-
ficient number of defectors and S is sufficiently low. For
S  φ, the population is approximately 50% coopera-
tor, since selection is effectively indifferent between the
two strategies. However, as φ → 0, we observe a phase
transition into the next regime.
Panels c-h of Figure 3 depict a qualitatively different
phenomenon than φ  0. Here, selection will occur on
both strategies. In panels c and d, we observe no ex-
tinction events and a greater degree of cooperation than
when φ  0 and Fermi selection. Interestingly, when
φ = 0.5, we observe more cooperation than we do when
φ = 0. Note that the punishment payoff to defectors is
zero (P = 0). At φ = 0, this means that approximately
half of defectors will frequently be selected against when
playing many of their own strategy, and half will not.
However, at φ = 0.5, the deleterious effect to a defec-
tor playing against defector neighbours is much higher.
Thus, defector clusters are less stable than at a lower φ.
This phenomenon gives cooperators an advantage and
allows them to better flourish. Seeing that R = 1, co-
operative clusters are stable. Further, they may sustain
defectors (T > 1). These phenomena sustain a polymor-
phic population in the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant for
φ = 0.5 (e and f). However, for φ = 1 (g and h), poly-
morphisms are more prevalent in the Hawk Dove quad-
rant. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the DCO
model. For φ  1, cooperation cannot be sustained
and extinction occurs throughout parameter space (re-
sults not shown here).
Figure 4 depicts the results for the CDO model. These
results are remarkably similar to the model without dif-
fusion (Figure 3). The higher fitness a cooperator may
receive from being in a cooperator cluster does not ben-
efit them if they diffuse into a defector cluster, since we
are selecting for adequacy. Thus, unlike our other mod-
els, CDO does not appreciably increase cooperation with
respect to no diffusion.
Unlike the CDO model, the DCO model of indepen-
dent truncation differs from the no diffusion case for ap-
propriate φ as depicted in Figure 5. We do not observe
differences when φ = −0.5 (a and b). For φ = 0, we
observe less cooperation for DCO, which aligns with our
results for Fermi selection and dependent selection. Dif-
FIG. 3. Heatmap of average cooperation for independent
truncation with no diffusion. The left panels show the pro-
portion of cooperators relative to the number of live vertices.
White corresponds to defection and black to cooperation. The
right panels show the proportion of live vertices. Black cor-
responds to live and white to empty vertices.
fusing defectors can push the fitnesses of cooperators in
a cooperator cluster below the threshold. This effect, for
φ = 0.5 (e and f), results in extinction and less coopera-
tion. Defectors are able to disrupt cooperation by diffus-
ing into cooperative clusters. And, in some areas of pa-
rameter space, drive cooperators to extinction. However,
without cooperators to sustain defectors, they also go ex-
5FIG. 4. Heatmap of average cooperation for independent
truncation (CDO). The left panels show the proportion of
cooperators relative to the number of live vertices. White
corresponds to defection and black to cooperation. The right
panels show the proportion of live vertices. Black corresponds
to live and white to empty vertices.
tinct. This effect is greatest in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
region, but also affects parameter space bordering it.
For φ = 1, we observe an interesting phenomenon
where there is an intermediate optimal S with respect
to cooperation when T is high (Figure 5 g and h). Fig-
ure 6 depicts the time series so as to explain these results.
When S is too low (Figure 6 a), defectors frequently grow
FIG. 5. Heatmap of average cooperation for independent
truncation (DCO). The left panels show the proportion of
cooperators relative to the number of live vertices. White
corresponds to defection and black to cooperation. The right
panels show the proportion of live vertices. Black corresponds
to live and white to empty vertices.
too quickly and cause the population as a whole to crash,
and polymorphisms are unstable. As we increase S, the
basin of attraction to the all cooperator state increases.
The population initially crashes. And, though defectors
become extinct, cooperators can often survive and grow
to near the carrying capacity (Figure 6 b). For T = 2,
cooperation is optimally facilitated at S ≈ 0.5 (Figure 6
6FIG. 6. Time series for the DCO independent truncation
model. Each panel plots the total population for 50 time series
for a random initial condition. Cooperation is optimized for
an intermediate value of S (panel c). If S is too low, extinction
of both strategies is likely (panels a and b). However, if S
is too high (panel d), defectors can be sustained, thereby
restraining cooperation and the total population size.
c). Extinction is rare, and complete cooperation is often
reached. Paradoxically, at a higher S (Figure 6 d), coop-
eration is diminished. Here, the initial population crash
is less severe and a polymorphism is more stable.
FIG. 7. Heatmap of average cooperation for dependent trun-
cation with no diffusion. White corresponds to defection and
black to cooperation.
C. Dependent truncation
In general, for a given diffusion model, we observe more
cooperation in dependent truncation than we do in Fermi
selection regardless of the truncation level, τ . This pat-
tern holds for no diffusion, CDO, and DCO, as shown
in Figures 7, 8, and 9, respectively. However, the value
of τ affects each game differently, which can be seen by
examining the quadrants of the figures.
Figure 7 depicts the heatmap results for dependent
truncation with no diffusion for τ = 1, 2, 3, 4. Looking to
the top left quadrant of the figures, we see that there is no
effect of varying τ upon the harmony game; all players
cooperate. However, the levels of cooperation decrease
in the Stag Hunt game as τ is increased. The defection
strategy in the Stag Hunt game can be interpreted as a
risk averse strategy in that it always guarantees (not in-
cluding the stochastic component) a payoff between the
maximum and minimum that may be received by a coop-
erator. If τ is low, then survival this risk averse strategy
is unfit, since the model is selecting for high fitness. How-
ever, for a higher τ , the model selects against the lowest
fitness. In such a case, a risk averse strategy that avoids
the sucker’s payoff, S, can be beneficial. Nonetheless,
even when τ = 4, we still have higher cooperation in the
Stag Hunt game for dependent truncation than we do for
Fermi selection (Figure 2).
While τ is negatively correlated with cooperation in
the Stag Hunt, it is positively correlated with it in the
Hawk Dove game. As in the Stage Hunt, an understand-
ing of this phenomenon can be found in considering τ as
7FIG. 8. Heatmap of average cooperation for dependent trun-
cation (CDO). White corresponds to defection and black to
cooperation.
selecting for high fitness or against low fitness. Hawks
(defectors) have the higher variance in fitness unlike the
stag hunters (cooperators). Thus, when τ is low, selec-
tion is for high fitness individuals, which will more likely
be defectors in the Hawk Dove game where they were co-
operators in the Stag Hunt. Likewise, a high τ will select
for low variance players, the doves (cooperators).
There is little effect upon the low levels of cooperation
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, τ affects regions
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant differently. Close to
the boundary with the Stag Hunt quadrant, increasing τ
inhibits cooperation (as it does for the Stag Hunt game).
Similarly, near the boundary with the Hawk Dove game,
varying τ exhibits the same effect as it does in the Hawk
Dove game; it is correlated with cooperation.
Figures 8 and 9 mirror the qualitative observations we
have made thus far. τ has affects each game the same
as it does without diffusion. Further, we observe a simi-
lar phenomenon as in Fermi selection regarding the algo-
rithm’s order of operation. CDO facilitates cooperation
and DCO inhibits it. This result is insensitive to τ . In
particular, the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrant is devoid of
cooperation in DCO, but is present in CDO.
IV. DISCUSSION
Here we have systematically explored diffusion and dif-
ferent selection mechanisms on a square lattice of cooper-
ators and defectors. We have expanded the understand-
ing of selection mechanisms — such as Fermi selection
FIG. 9. Heatmap of average cooperation for dependent trun-
cation (DCO). White corresponds to defection and black to
cooperation.
and “imitate the best” — to incorporate stochastic pay-
offs, two truncation schemes, various levels of truncation,
and two diffusion algorithms.
We have uncovered three regimes for independent trun-
cation: cooperation decreases as we increase the thresh-
old parameter, φ; polymorphisms and extinction can oc-
cur; and extinction of the total population occurs. For
the DCO model of independent truncation, we observe
that for a high temptation, cooperation is best facilitated
if the sucker’s payoff is intermediate. We can understand
this result by considering the cooperators as prey and
defectors as predators. The sucker’s payoff is therefore
the death rate due to predation. At our initial condi-
tions, the population experiences an initial crash, which
drives the defectors to extinction. If defectors survive
the initial crash, the population faces oscillations of high
amplitude, which results in further population crashes.
If the sucker’s payoff is too low, cooperators often cannot
survive a crash and thus the whole population of repli-
cators goes extinct. As the sucker’s payoff is increased,
cooperators are better able to survive a crash, and thus
we see the system frequently evolving to being wholly
composed of cooperators. However, if the sucker’s pay-
off is too high, then the population crash is mitigated,
which prevents defectors from going extinct. We thereby
reach a stable polymorphism and the amplitude of the
oscillation in the total population are relatively small.
Dependent truncation is an extension of “imitate the
best.” However, we vary how many of the best players
from which we choose for reproduction (by choosing τ).
For low τ , we select from the very best of the population.
8For high τ , the majority of the players may be chosen to
reproduce. And, as such, we are selecting against the
least fit players. τ has different effects on the density of
cooperators for different games. While the harmony and
prisoner’s dilemma were not much affected, the Hawk
Dove and Stag Hunt were. As we raise τ , we decrease
cooperation in the Stag Hunt game, but increase it in
the Hawk Dove game. This phenomenon occurs with
and without diffusion (and for both DCO and CDO).
Both of these truncation methods can have substan-
tially more cooperation than observed for Fermi selec-
tion given the same diffusion rule. However, independent
truncation can have less cooperation than Fermi selection
when the threshold, φ, is low.
The impact of diffusion is most acute for one diffusion
event per player on average, d = 1. We ran simulations
up to d = 5 and observed only negligible effects upon our
results. The DCO algorithm permits the disruption of
clusters of cooperators by allowing defectors on the edge
of the cluster to diffuse into it, where they exploit and
out-compete their cooperating neighbours (though this
effect is muted in independent truncation). In the CDO
algorithm, however, players play their neighbours and
then diffuse. Thus, cooperators in clusters earn high fit-
nesses and then may diffuse into defector clusters, where
fitnesses are low. Defectors that diffuse into cooperative
clusters will have low fitnesses earned from their defector
neighbours, and thus cannot become established within
the cooperative clusters and thereby disrupt them.
While a variety of graphs and diffusion processes have
been explored in the literature, truncation selection on
evolutionary graphs has not. The generalization of “imi-
tate the best” and the rich behaviours these models can
models can produce suggest much interesting future re-
search.
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